Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict

Book Review (Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan.)

What if I told you...

that nonviolence was more effective than violence?

"Pacifism is fine in theory. But we live in the real world, and in the real world it doesn't work"

I may never have heard exactly that claim in those words, but it's definitely a real objection that people have. What about... those cases where nothing but violent resistance will do?

Christian nonviolence, at least of the variety that I subscribe to, is not predicated on efficacy or success. That is to say, I don't think the primary reason you should practice non-violence is because you think it gets better real-world outcomes, but because we follow a saviour who taught us to love our enemies, not resist an evil person, lay down our life for our friends, and that those who live by the sword die by it. It's a losing proposition for those the world regards as losers because Jesus was in all those sense of realpolitik, a loser. Except that he rose from the dead.

This book isn't a Christian book, it's a research volume in the world of social studies, international geopolitics, war and peace studies, etc.. And it comes with a remarkable thesis: in an examination of 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns, between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent campaigns achieve partial or full success at twice the rate of violent campaigns.

Any way you slice this pie, nonviolence comes out looking like a better option.

But, but, but. You may be like Chenoweth herself, who discusses how she was initially a skeptic to this whole project and thesis. She, like most people, worked on the assumption that people turn to violence because nonviolence doesn’t work, and violence does.¹ And, naturally, you may have questions or push-back to the data and analysis. Chenoweth and Stephan anticipate and deal with a lot of those issues in the first few chapters. I can't speak much to the statistics in this book, but I can outline the major components of their research. At the end I'll return to broader questions about implications and intersection with theology and political life, so if you want to skip down to that section:

The research itself

Chenoweth and Stephan analysed 323 resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006. Of these, nonviolent resistance campaigns were twice as likely to achieve full or partial success. They are greatly more successful in antiregime resistance, slightly more successful in territorial campaigns (anti-occupation, self-determination), and unsuccessful in secession campaigns (but violent secession campaigns are incredibly rarely successful in secession as well).

Why do they succeed better? C&S make the argument that nonviolent campaigns have a lower barrier to participation, and so higher participation overall, which creates other flow-on effects: resilience, tactical innovation, increased civic disruption, and loyalty shifts in the opponent's supporters. Violence campaigns have higher participation barriers (i.e. you need to be willing to go a be a guerrilla fighter and die), which means that violent insurgency tends to have very low participation rates.

C&S consider, within their argument, why some cases succeed and some fail. For example, violent campaigns are more likely to succeed with external support. Nonviolent campaigns are more likely to succeed, simply, as their participation numbers are rates grow. Numbers alone are insufficient to guarantee success (e.g. anti-communist campaigns in East Germany in the 1950s). But as the number of quality participants grow, the cost to the adversary increases in terms of civic (and thus economic) disruption. Loyalty shifts, especially among the security forces, also become more likely. It's hard(er) for soldiers to deploy violence against people they know, especially when they are committed to nonviolence resistance. Loyalty shifts are one of the biggest predictors of success.

In a subsequent chapter C&S discuss alternative explanations for success. For example, they consider whether authoritarian regimes, powerful opponents, or repressive opponents are better at opposing a nonviolent campaign. The analysis says that nonviolent campaigns are equally likely to succeed against authoritarians as democratic regimes, similarly against powerful opponents, and against repression. Campaign goals do, however, affect outcomes. Secession campaigns are very difficult. Anti-occupation campaigns have better odds of limited success, while regime change campaigns are more likely to achieve either limited or full success (and quite likely to achieve full success)

An aside: the 3.5% rule. Chenoweth coined this term in a 2013 TEDx talk, that no revolution has failed once it reaches 3.5% percent of the population actively participating in a peak mass event (e.g. mass demonstration). That's a historical data point, not a guarantee for the future. It's also a symptom, not a cause. E.g., if a mass resistance movement can get to that number, it ought to reflect the underlying support it has, but simply reaching that number is not itself the catalyst for success. Chenoweth notes from 2019 data that the 1962 revolt in Brunei, and the 2011-2014 Bahrain uprising are exceptions to the rule.²

The case studies

There are four cases studies in the book, chosen both to illustrate success and failure, often contrasting campaigns in the same country, and really to show variety in a way that undermines certain myths and misconceptions. They are Iran, the Philippines, the Palestinian Territories, and Burma. These all made for very interesting reading. Iran, because it was a nonviolent campaign that led to a regime change that installed an Islamic authoritarian regime. The Palestinian Territories examines the success of the First Intifada, while it was nonviolent, before it turned significant violent (and divided), and failed. The Philippines, because it contrasts ongoing violent insurgency that failed, with the success of the nonviolent campaign. Lastly, Burma, where both violent and nonviolent campaigns failed.

Photo by Thomas de LUZE on Unsplash

Post-conflict outcomes

A final section of the book examines post-conflict outcomes, with nonviolent resistance campaigns far more likely to create democratic regimes and ensure civil peace, whereas violence campaigns are more likely to end up in a non-democratic regime, to perpetuate violence, either state-backed repression, or civil war. It's almost like the means determines the end, rather than ends justifying means.

Take-aways & mythbusting

Here I want to sum up some of the key take-aways of this research as a whole, especially the ones that are contrary to commonly held beliefs.

Only against people that respect human rights

"A common misperception about nonviolent resistance is that it can succeed only against liberal, democratic regimes espousing universalistic values like respect for human rights. ... the empirical record does not support this argument", in fact, the opposite. [p19]. C&S then discuss the "classic straw-man" of Stalin and Hitler. "Collective nonviolent struggle was not used with any strategic forethought during World War II, nor was it ever contemplated as an overall strategy for resisting the Nazis. Violent resistance, which some groups attempted for ending Nazi occupation, was also an abject failure." [20] They then go on to discuss partially successful forms of collective nonviolent resistance, e.g. in Denmark, and the Rosenstrasse protests.

"the notion that nonviolent action can be successful only if the adversary does not use violent repression is neither theoretically nor historically substantiated". [20]. Indeed, as they go on to show, repression against nonviolent movements often backfires (whereas it less often backfires against violent resistance campaigns).

There is no type of regime or situation that is immune to nonviolence being more effective than violence. C&S concede that they are not arguing that nonviolence can and will always succeed against genocidal opponents, they are arguing that this isn’t an argument against them. It is not an opponent’s willingness to use deadly and brutal force that determines who will win. “Genocidaires are only as powerful as the henchman and underlings who carry out their orders”³ This suggests an answer to the ‘what about Hitler’ argument. We simply don’t know that a strategic broadly supported nonviolent campaign against Nazism wouldn’t have worked, but we should not assume that it wouldn’t have worked because it was nonviolent.

The efficacy of nonviolence does not depend upon moral superiority. “Campaigns do not succeed simply because they have won the moral high ground, as some may suggest” (221). Rather, it’s determined by analysing the campaign as a whole, its strategic adaptation and ability against the adversary. It’s a conflict by other means.

Violence as a last resort. “The argument that using violent resistance is the only effective way to win concessions from a repressive adversary simply does not stand up to the evidence. Nonviolent resistance has the strategic edge. The evidence presented also rejects the claim that there are some types of states against which only violence will work. We were able to discern no such states in this study.” (226)

“Insurgents who claim that violent resistance is necessary are probably always wrong.” (227)

Indeed, the claim to be using it as a last resort is undermined by the observation that often they have chosen it as a first resort.

As I’ve mentioned, Chenoweth has a more recent book which discusses civil resistance in a more question/answer format, includes some updated research, and isn’t written for academics. I’ll conclude with her final five points from that volume:

1. Civil resistance is a realistic and more effective alternative to violent resistance in most settings. Civil resistance is not about being nice or civil, but refers to resistance grounded in community action. It is about fighting back and building new alternatives using methods that are more inclusive and effective than violence.

2. Civil resistance works not by melting the adversary’s heart, but by creating defections from his support base.

3. Civil resistance involves much more than just protest— it includes methods of noncooperation, like strikes, and the creation of new alternatives, like mutual aid organizations, alternative economic systems, and alternative political groups, where people experience what life under a new system might look like.

4. Civil resistance has been far more effective over the past one hundred years than armed resistance, both in pushing forward major progressive change and democratization, and doing so without creating long-term humanitarian crises in the meantime.

5. Although nonviolent resistance does not always succeed, it works much more than its detractors want you to know.⁴

Chenoweth, Erica. Civil Resistance (What Everyone Needs To Know?) (p. 251). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

1. Chenoweth discusses this both in her TEDx talk, and the preface to her more recent book Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to Know (OUP 2021)

2. This is also from Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to Know

3. Citing Summy, Ralph 1994. ‘Nonviolence and the case of the extremely ruthless opponent. Pacifica Review 6, no. 1 (May/June): 1-29.

4. Chenoweth, Erica. Civil Resistance (What Everyone Needs To Know?) (pp. 251-252). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.