"Why the Modern male is struggling, why it matters, and what to do about it"
Not aiming low with that sub-title. As I have said, it was fascinating to read this alongside Perry's book from last week. Reeves' volume from just two years ago received a lot of coverage, a lot of people read it, and here am I catching up with the Discourse.
Reeves writes an account that is sociological and economic in orientation, and political in solution. Among his six reasons for writing this book, at this time, he says:
Third, it became clear to me that the problems of boys and men are structural in nature, rather than individual; but are rarely treated as such. The problem with men is typically framed as a problem of men. It is men who must be fixed, one man or boy at a time. This individualist approach is wrong.
Reeves also describes himself as a "conscientious objector in the culture wars"; if anything he seems to sit a little on the centre-left, but his analysis, critiques, and suggestions cut across standard right-left analyses, and as we'll see this is with great reason.
The first part of this book, chapters 1-3, describes how men are falling behind (on general measures of social and economic wellbeing and 'success') in education, the labor market, family life. And here's one of the first things about Reeves that is laudable. Reeves shows all this from data (for America, primarily), and yet can still acknowledge that in many, in more areas, women are disadvantaged. As he repeatedly says, we can hold two things in our mind. These things can both be true. We can live in a world where there is systemic and pervasive male privilege, and yet men can be losing gender equality in various specific ways. The inability and the unwillingness to see this harms us all.
Chapters 4 and 5 look at double disadvantage (the dreaded intersectionality). What happens when you are Black and male, or poor and male? The disadvantages in specific areas compound.
All of this is interesting, of course, but it gets more interesting when you get Reeves doing more creative work about how and why this is all the case. For example, his analysis of the change in marriage:
educated Americans have transformed marriage from an institution of economic dependency into a joint venture for the purpose of parenting.
and the transformation of men's cultural role from being provider in the family, to not having provider as a distinct role, and struggling to articulate an alternate role in parenting. All of these things feed together, to a loss of an overriding cultural script for what it means to be a man.
“A model of stable masculinity,” writes David Morgan, “would include a relatively high degree of congruence between public discourses about masculinity and the public and private practices of masculinity. For individual men, there would be a sense of ontological security.” ³ ⁹ This is not a great slogan. “What do we want? Ontological security! When do we want it? Now!”
Reeves, like Perry, is prepared to wade into the often untouchable conversation about biologically-grounded differences. And in this section (ch 7) their arguments, and caveats, are similar. There are a range of sex differences that occur because of biology, have a psychological and cultural expression, and these factors (biology and culture) are not separate, they affect and influence each other. They are also statistical averages, not universal truths. So, men on average have higher aggression, risk-taking, sex drive, and interested in 'things' more than people (hence the STEM-bias in education and labor).
There's a fascinating little insight here from looking at women in STEM in the Nordic countries, where gender equality is very high and so is economic prosperity. Counter-intuitive to the belief that more women would be in STEM if only they didn't face barriers and discrimination, the numbers end up being lower than expected. So, Olga Khazan, "It’s not that gender equality discourages girls from pursuing science. It’s that it allows them not to if they’re not interested.”
But perhaps what I think Reeves best puts his finger on is my equal dis-satisfaction with both the right and the left. I, too, think there's a kind of crisis of masculinity in our culture, and I see that, and I feel some of it. But the Left has no answers, and the Right's answers are deeply disturbing (and wrong). As Reeves puts it so succinctly, the Right weaponizes masculinity, and the Left pathologizes it. Over two chapters he makes the argument that the Left:
pathologizes natural aspects of masculinity, making everything 'toxic'; being male itself is the problem
individualism: unlike the Left's tendency to address structural issues, it refuses to see systemic problems for men and so it's best advice is "figure it out yourself, stop being a problem"
a refusal to acknowledge biological bases for sex differences
a fixed belief that gender inequality can only and ever run in one direction
And the Right:
Capitalizes on male grievances for political gain, which increases anger and discontent
Over-weights the biological differences' importance for gender differentiation and roles
Idealizes the Past as having all the solutions to mens' problems.
Reeves, I dare say, doesn't actually have an answer for some of his own bigger questions. He does have policy and structural ideas for the kinds of issues he raises in chapters 1-5, and he lays them out: delaying boys entering school by a whole year; actively promoting programs to help men into HEAL jobs (Health, Education, Administration, Literacy); and developing fatherhood as an independent social institution.
So, here's one point where comparing with Perry is interesting: whereas Perry will argue that monogamous marriage is good for women, and children, and so her argument aligns with social conservative interests, Reeves doesn't have an analysis that sees the decline of marriage or the rise of divorce or single parenting as 'bad', and so he makes no case for more and longer marriages. Instead he sees the solution in terms of a role for dads that is independent of the marital-family unit.
But when I say that Reeves doesn't have a broader solution, it's that a cultural script for what it means to be a man, an existential offering to men, is just too big a problem and requires more philosophical heavy lifting than I think Reeves himself would commit to. This is where you end up with the Peterson problem - as much as I really hate the Right's weaponization of men's problems, I have to concede that it succeeds in part because there's a vacuum.
What Reeves thinks is needed, is a pro-social vision for male identity and practice in society. Instead of a conservative one. And at this point, I have to agree. I think there is a space, and a need, for a constructive rebuild of male identity and role in broader society. But I am also pessimistic about how possible this is on a broad scale in the 21st Industrialised West.
I haven't attempted to write anything here really about the way I think this intersects with Christianity. If you know me and my general stance on things, you'll know that I certainly don't think the answer is to throw in our lot with either side of the culture wars or the political spectrum. I'm more critical of conservative Christian responses that buddy-up to the Right. I think it's theologically disturbing when people align themselves with the Jordan Petersons of the world, precisely because they are eerily adjacent but actually deeply distant from genuine Christian faith and belief. I think that kind of alliance will only ever serve the interests of the outside parties, and damage Christians and the church. I have no better opinion of the progressive, secular left, but I think no-one there is really pretending to be our friends to exploit us politically.
The last thing to say, is that here is the best, long-form essay I've read on masculinity and all these related issues. So if you have another stretch of time up your sleeve, go and read Christine Emba's piece:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/07/10/christine-emba-masculinity-new-model/